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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
SIXTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS 
UNITED STATES CURRENCY, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 950284-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to § 78-
2a-3(g) Utah Code Annptated (1994) , in that this case is an appeal 
of a judgment of forfeiture in the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Appellant's Point One is that the trial court erred 
in finding the subject currency susceptible to forfeiture. "The 
proper construction of the Utah Controlled Substances Act is a 
question of law." State of Utah v. One 1984 Oldgmobile and One 
Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Dollars in 
United States Currency, 892 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1995) (citing State v. 
A House & 1.37 Acres of Real Property Located at 392 South 600 
East, Nephi. 886 P.2d 534, 537 (Utah 1994)). This Court shall 
therefore grant no particular deference to the district court's 
rulings. Rather it should review them for correctness. State v. 
One 1984 Oldsmobile. 892 P.2d 1042, 1044 (citing World Peace 
Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp,, 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 
1994)); accord Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 
1990). 
2. Appellant's Point Two is that the trial court erred 
by making inadequate findings of fact. The standard for review as 
to Point Two, is one of correctness. Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 
474, 477 (Utah App. 1991). 
3. Appellant's Point Three is that the Court erred by 
refusing to grant a continuance. The standard for review as to 
Point Three, as an abuse of discretion is a clearly erroneous 
standard. A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no 
reasonable basis for the decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 
860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). A trial court's determination will 
be reversed if the ruling is so unreasonable that it can be 
classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of 
discretion. Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993); 
Radcliffe v. Akhavan. 875 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah App. 1994). 
Appellant asserts due process grounds for seeking review of 
the issues above which were not preserved in the trial court. 
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property. U.S. , 
114 S. Ct. 492 (1993). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Appellant asserts the Utah Supreme Court's decision in In re: 
One Hundred Two Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency, 823 P.2d 468 
(Utah 1992) is dispositive of this matter. Appellant suggests 
further that the United States Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. 
James Daniel Good Real Property U.S. , 114 S.Ct. 492 
2 
(1993) is likewise dispositive of this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment dotted January 31, 1995 of 
forfeiture of sixteen thousand dollars in U.S. currency. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On February 24, 1994, Utah Highway Patrol officers made a 
traffic stop of a 1988 Hyundai automobile in Grand County, Utah. 
Sixteen thousand dollars in cash was found in the car's bumper. On 
September 27, 1994, Grand County Attorney William L. Benge 
commenced a forfeiture action pursuant to provisions of § 58-37-13 
Utah Code Annotated. Several days prior to the complaint being 
filed, an attorney from Van Nuys, California had written Mr. Benge 
to inquire of the status of the matter. On November 2, 1994, 
Mr. Benge corresponded with Mr. Hammond, informing him that a 
hearing had been set for December 7, 1994. On December 2, 1994 
Isidro Garcia filed a pro se response to claimant's complaint. The 
hearing set for December 6, 1994 was continued until January 25, 
1995. Prior to the hearing, Mr. Garcia, through Mr. Hammond, 
requested that the matter be continued. The matter was not 
continued, a default hearing was conducted, and judgment was 
subsequently entered for claimant on January 31, 1995. 
Counsel for Appellant filed a Motion for Relief From Judgment 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b) on March 1, 
1995. Notice of Appeal was filed on March 2, 1995. This matter 
was heard before the Seventh District Court on April 5, 1995. The 
Motion for Relief was denied. 
C. DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
3 
Final judgment of forfeiture was entered by the trial court on 
January 31, 1995. 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant appeals from the final order of the Court which 
forfeits sixteen thousand dollars in United States currency. 
Appellant was not present nor represented at the evidentiary 
hearing at which the District Court found that the subject currency 
was subject to forfeiture pursuant to the provisions of S 58-37-13, 
Utah Code Annotated (1993). Transcript at 3, 4. This matter had 
previously been continued at the instance of the Grand County 
Attorney. Transcript at 3. An attorney licensed to practice in 
California (but not a member of Utah's bar) had requested a 
continuance two days prior to the scheduled (continued) hearing to 
affiliate with local counsel or to become admitted pro hac vice. 
Transcript at 3,4. This request was denied, and the matter went 
forward as a default proceeding. Transcript at 4. Only the 
investigative officer, Trooper Darrel Mecam testified. Transcript 
at 4-10. 
No attempt was made by the state to prove that the money came 
from or was intended to be used in a drug transaction in this 
state. Transcript at 4-10. No criminal charges were filed against 
either of the occupants of the vehicle from which the currency was 
seized. Transcript at 4-10. No physical evidence was introduced 
at the hearing. Transcript at 4-10. No laboratory results were 
offered or received into evidence Transcript at 4-10. 
On February 24, 1994, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Darrel Mecam 
was on patrol in his vehicle on Interstate 70 in Grand County, 
Utah. Transcript at 5. He observed a 1988 Hyundai automobile 
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travelling westbound at 7 6 mph. He effectuated a traffic stop. 
Transcr 
Troopers Mecam and Porter (who was patrolling with Mecam) 
engaged the occupants of t Hyundai i :onversation Transcript 
Trooper - __ _ _ sidro Gar 
herei/i) for his driver's 1 icense ' registration, Transcript at 5. 
Trooper Mecam likewise asked the passenger I produce 
identification, which he Transcript -**" 6. Neil" I" i ncupant 
identified the owner of the stopped vehicle. Transcript at 6. 
Trooper Mecam detected of alcohol from the passenger. 
Transcript < I' "i "111"! Ixoopers received ronf lief i nq stxiir i i'/i l"i mn 
the occupants about from where they were driving. Transcript at 6. 
Trooper Mecam learned from Grand County dispatch that the passenger 
had pri or control] e< :1 substance charges Transcr nrooper 
Mecam asked Mr. Garcia i ( I lie jar was stolen, where he had been, 
whether he had hauled controlled substances in the ar to Chicago, 
and whether there were c i i) firearms :::>:i : large sums 
vehicle. Mr. Garcia answered 1 questions. Transcript 
Trooper Mecam next "obtained a consent to search the e 
veh11 1 ' Transcript at 7. The officers placed the occupants 
handcuffs sc t:l: .ej could commence the search Transcript at 
Trooper Porter searched the interior portion, Trooper Mecam search 
exterior ni I I eJiicl "i Trooper Mecam detected an odor n^ 
burnt marijuana coming from within the vehicle. Transcript at 
Trooper Mecam suspected there was a hidden compartment 
bumper. Transcript a I : 8 H a pulled the rubber covering 
bumper and discovered two metal compartments, approximately * -
5 
inches long. Transcript at 8. He opened the ends of the 
compartments and discovered a Browning .22 rifle, cash, and 
••marijuana residue" inside. Transcript at 8. Trooper Mecam asked 
Isidro Garcia about the gun and the money. Mr. Garcia answered, 
•'yes, that it was money that he had derived from the sale of drugs 
and the rifle was his." Transcript at 9. 
Trooper Mecam further testified that the marijuana residue 
tested positive for marijuana, and that an unidentified Grand 
County Detective "perform(ed) a sniff of the vehicle or the money 
or the gun or compartment," and that "they alerted on both the car 
and the money." Transcript at 9, 10. 
There was no testimony elicited about where any purported drug 
transaction occurred. There was no evidence presented that either 
occupant of the vehicle which had been stopped for speeding was 
made aware of rights afforded pursuant to Miranda v Arizona. 384 
U.S. 436 (1966). There was no evidence about the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the "consent" to search. There was no 
evidence about the duration of the stop, or the process by which 
the Troopers determined that a search was necessary. There was no 
evidence of the disposition of the individuals involved, whether 
they were arrested, or charged with any criminal offense. 
The Court found that the State had sustained its burden of 
showing that the defendant currency was the product of violation of 
the controlled substances laws of Utah. Transcript at 10. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case begins with the routine traffic stop of a westbound 
vehicle travelling interstate through Grand County, Utah, and ends 
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with sixteen thousand dollars being forfeited to the state. The 
r o r < i i 11 mi " l ( j I i"" " » • ' ' I "" i""i I mi mi in I it i n 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 in 
record is void of an> ,:*;: between the currency and violation 
Utah Law. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRE 
SUBJECT TO FORFEITURE. 
Appea ixi re One Hundred "*"I wo Thousand Dollars ii i 
U.S. Currency, 823 P.2d 468 (Utah 1992) for the proposition that 
secreted currency t * - • subject to forfeiture absent evidence that 
tend' = I t :: • k = " is = :i :ii i :t i „ i r i j 
transaction within Utah. 
' In that case, in ider facts similar t :: the instant case, 
") C ; ; i i i; 11; _) < i j j, • mi in, i ) : i I I i 11 j L £ i • i i ) p | > ts "i i : i • .ii i in < ;• i i • » ,i i 1111 e i :b 1 a t < 
because :i t: was spewing smoke. 823 P. 2d at 4 59. The deputy 
discovered that the vehicle carried two fuel tanks, one of which 
arrestee tn* drivei * driving suspended license and 
impounded th-- vehicle. Officers then obtained a search warrant, 
s e - i - - n i l 1 , ,in I 11", i vi ' i ij11 ij if i t> h i i i i a iv I ,' " I 
the false fuel tank. A, drug dog alerted on t„l-v"3 currency 
charges were filed against any of the occupants of the vehicle. Id. 
II I n . l i i p n . H I I ' 11 II II in 11 II • ; . • • . ' • 
We find it unnecessary to comment on the sufficiency of 
the evidence because a basic element of a cause of action 
for forfeiture is absent. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (l)g) 
provides that the following are subject to forfeiture: 
"everything of value furnished or intended to be 
furnished in exchange for a controlled substance iii 
violation of this act, all proceeds traceable to any 
violation of this act, and all monies, negotiable 
instruments, and securities used or intended to be used 
to facilitate any violation of this act , , ," The 
statute thus provides for the forfeiture of currency only 
when it has been used or was intended to be used to 
7 
facilitate a violation of the act. It is not enough that 
the currency may have been generated in a drug 
transaction which took place outside of Utah. (emphasis 
added). In that case, there would be no violation of the 
Utah act. It is only when the Utah act is violated that 
drug proceeds are subject to forfeiture under Section 58-
37-13(1). Here, no attempt was made by the State to 
prove that the money came from or was intended to be used 
in a drug transaction in this state. No controlled 
substances were found in the van or on the person of any 
of the occupants. No criminal charges were filed against 
any of them. The van was merely passing through Utah on 
an interstate highway. 
The judgment cannot be sustained due to the lack of 
an element of forfeiture. 
Id. at 469-70. See also, State v. One 1984 Oldsmobile, 892 P.2d 
1042, 1045 (Utah 1995). As was the case in One Hundred Two 
Thousand Dollars, the State in the case sub judice made no attempt 
to prove that the money came from or was intended to be used in a 
drug transaction in Utah. The district court herein erred when it 
granted the state's petition for forfeiture of the currency. 
POINT TWO: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING INADEQUATE FINDINGS 
OF FACT 
Rule 52 (a) , UTAH R. CIV. P., provides that M[i]n all actions 
tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon . . . ." "Utah appellate courts 
*consistently stress7 the importance of adequate * findings of 
fact./M Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991) (citing 
State v. Viail, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1991)). MTo succeed 
in challenging the findings, appellant must prove that they are 
clearly erroneous, i.e., against the clear weight of the evidence." 
Id. at 477. (citations omitted). Therefore, if we are to 
determine whether the evidence adduced at trial supports the trial 
court's findings, the findings must embody sufficient detail and 
8 
include enough subsidiary facts :learly show the evidence upon 
adequate findings of fact, meaningful review of decision's 
evidentiary basis is virtually impossible.,; Id. citations 
omitted) . The i i cvi^al 
the trial court's reasoning process. Reid v. Mutual gf Omaha Ins. 
Co. , 77 6 P, 2d 896 „, 899 (lit .ah 1989); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P. 2d 
ITlfi. 1 338 (Ut ! I i 1 S • 3 9) 
"The process of marshalling the evidence serves the important 
function of reminding litigants and appellate courts of the Lroad 
deference owed I I In hi I I iiinlli i I I i i Il W o o d w a r d , H ? i III1 " 
(quoting State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App.1990 
"However, w*. grant this deference when findings 
fa 
f c court" lecision.* * t. "Unless the record 
*clear1 incontroverted!\ support[s ' tne trial court's 
"
!
 • 
requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial court." Id. 
a t 1 ' "i • • . • ' • • : ' ' ' ' '• • 
H e r i» I I n i i in in i . in in mi m l i i n | i w v I P , i in mi mi 1*1 : 
The Court finds that the State has sustained its burden 
of showing that the defendant vehicle and the defendant 
currency were the product of violation of the controlled 
substances laws of this state and that they are 
forfeitable to the State of Utah to be used as provided 
by law, and the Court will enter an order of forfeiture. 
disclose the evidentiary basis for the Court decision, nor 
they sufficiently reveal the court7s reasoning process, 
9 
court. 
POINT THREE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A 
CONTINUANCE 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution guarantees that "[n]o person shall . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.H 
"Our precedents establish the general rule that individuals must 
receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Government 
deprives them of property.11 Id. at 498 (citing United States v. 
$8,850, 461 U.S. 555, 562 n. 12 (1983), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 
67, 82 (1972), Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 
337 (1969), Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 
306, 313 (1950)). "Although Congress designed the drug forfeiture 
statute to be a powerful instrument in enforcement of the drug 
laws, it did not intend to deprive innocent owners of their 
property. The affirmative defense of innocent ownership is allowed 
by statute." Id. at 501. "The purpose of an adversary hearing is 
to ensure the requisite neutrality that must inform all 
governmental decisionmaking. That protection is of particular 
importance here, where the government has a direct pecuniary 
interest in the outcome of the proceeding." Id. at 502. "Fair 
procedures are not confined to the innocent. The question before 
us is the legality of the seizure, not the strength of the 
Governments case." Id. at 505. 
Here, the record shows that the monies seized had been in the 
possession of the State of Utah from February 24, 1994 until 
September 27, 1994 without a petition for forfeiture by the State 
even being filed. The matter had been continued once at the 
10 
request nl the St ri 1 e The claimant, Isidro Garcia had filed a pro 
1 T Il I III 
asserted a claim to the funds. The record also reflects that the 
Court considered a Motion to Continue, which was denied without 
possession "m ^ 
funds monies would disappear 
otherwise b<* unavailable future date. The state could 
-in i Il 11u 1,1 ni "i I InI. i; L a i m a n t 
w i entitled c .: a i . . » . i n hearing on the merits, of which 
WH deprived ^ ^ * *u- constitutional right to e 
liscretior refusing 
continuance. 
CONCLUSION 
reverse the 
decision of the trial court, or should remand the matter for 
additional proceedings. 
U e b i j o i . ' l I ii I I | ill mi I I I i il M M . J2_. ' ' h Ml 'Vii(ju I , l l i ' . ) 5 . 
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3 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Case is State of Utah versus $16,000, 
civil number 9407-59. 
MR. BENGE: Your Honor, in this matter our records 
don't indicate that there was ever a claim made pursuant to the 
statute by the person with the property interest in this 
property. We are prepared to proceed, however. 
THE COURT: The record will show that this matter 
has been continued twice before, once on the request of the 
prosecution because the witnesses were not available, the 
State's witnesses were unavailable on that day, and then again 
because someone had contacted the State, a possible claimant had 
contacted the State. The State had wished to give them an 
additional six weeks to make a claim if they desired to do so. 
MS. STARLEY: Your Honor, which claim are we on? 
THE COURT: $16,000. 
The Court has received by fax two days ago a 
document signed by a Barry Hammond, which gives no indication 
that Mr. Hammond is a licensed member of the Utah State Bar. 
The case numbers are wrong, but they are the same numbers that 
were in some of the pleadings filed by the State, so I would 
excuse that. It's entitled People of the State of California 
versus $16,000 and the 1988 Hyundai. 
MR. BENGE: Your Honor, just for the record, I am 
aware that -- I would state that that does not comply with the 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, DONNA J. RICHINS, CSR, RPR 
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Utah rules of pleadings, which require a bar number. I have no 
evidence that Mr. Hammond is a member of the Utah State Bar. 
And I would state that when he contacted our office 
approximately two months ago to ask for a continuance of this 
matter, he was told or reminded that he would need an associate 
from the Utah Council if he wanted to proceed (inaudible). It 
doesn't seem he has done that. So I would ask that his — that 
faxed claim be struck and we would proceed in default. 
THE COURT: That request is granted. I suppose you 
would like to consolidate this with the next case — 
MR. BENGE: Yes, I would. 
THE COURT: — the State of Utah versus the Hyundai, 
We will also call civil number 9407-60, the same evidence in 
both those cases at a consolidated hearing. 
Call your witness, Mr. Benge. 
MR. BENGE: Thank you. May we proceed? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
DARREL MECAM, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff, having 
been first duly sworn to testify, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BENGE: 
Q. State your name, please. 
A. Darrel Mecam. 
Q. How are you employed? 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, DONNA J- RICHINS, CSR, RPR 
5 
A. Utah Highway Patrol. 
Q. Calling your attention to the 24th day of February 
of this year, did you have contact with one 1988 Hyundai motor 
vehicle? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What were the circumstances? 
A. I was patrolling with Trooper Glenn Porter. Trooper 
Peterson was eastbound for Colorado. He called to advise he had 
just observed a vehicle coming west at a high rate of speed, 
activated his radar, said it was 88 miles an hour, could not 
cross the median, and had me watch for the said vehicle. 
At 179 a small, dark car came by at 7 6 miles an hour. I 
proceeded through the median to catch up to the vehicle. 
Q. What happened when you — Did you ultimately stop 
the vehicle? 
A. Yes. As it come up behind me in the lane change 
without signaling, I activated my lights and summoned it to the 
roadside. 
Q. What then happened? 
A. Trooper Porter approached the window, asked for a 
driver's license and registration. The driver had no picture 
ID. He produced a title to the car, and I don't believe he 
could produce any ID with any kind of picture or anything like 
that. 
Q. What then happened? 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, DONNA J. RICHINS, CSR, RPR 
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A. I asked the passenger if he had any identification, 
which he did. I gave this to Trooper Porter. Porter needed one 
of them -- names or anything, match anything to the vehicle or 
anything with the vehicle. And I distinctly remember asking the 
passenger who the car belonged to. He stated he did not know. 
Also the driver didn't know who owned the car. 
Q. What did you then do? 
A. While talking to the passenger, the odor of alcholic 
beverage was present on him. I could smell that. I asked the 
passenger where he was coming from. He said the driver had 
driven up from California and picked him up in Fort Morgan 
because he was out of work and needed a ride home. In talking 
to the driver, he stated he had been to Chicago, was on his way 
home and picked up Istophal (phonetic) hitchhiking. 
Q. What did you then do? 
A. Run a check through dispatch on both subjects. I 
believe I ran it through Grand County. Our dispatch for some 
reason was down, 1038, computer was down. It showed that 
Istophal (phonetic) had a III showing previous controlled 
subtance charges. 
THE COURT: Who is Istophal (phonetic)? 
THE WITNESS: He was the passenger. 
Q. (By Mr. Benge) After finding out that, what did you 
do? 
A. I approached Isidro on the fact that he didn't know 
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who the car belonged to or anything and asked him if possibly 
the car was stolen. Isidro stated that it was not, I asked 
Isidro where he had been, if possibly he had hauled controlled 
substance in the car to Chicago. He stated no. I asked if 
there were any firearms or large sums of money, which he also 
stated no. 
Q. What did you then do? 
A. I obtained a consent to search the entire vehicle. 
He said — 
Q. Did you do that? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did you do and what were the results of that? 
A. I had Istophal (phonetic) and Isidro stand in the 
front of the vehicle off the side of the road. On opening the 
door you could immediately smell the odor of burnt marijuana 
coming from within the vehicle. Due to the fact that it was 
cold, I hadn't noticed that before. The windows on the vehicle 
were up. Looking through the vehicle, as Trooper Porter was 
going through the passenger (inaudible), I walked around the 
back side, did kneel down, looked underneath the bumper. It had 
a rubber covered bumper. The screws, the molding screws in that 
all appeared to have been recently removed and replaced, had 
fresh marks on them. 
Q. What then happened? 
A. I looked under -- I then grabbed a blanket, laid 
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down on the road, crawled under to look at the inside of the 
bumper. There are usually some holes for the absorption if 
there is an impact. The holes were not there. They had 
apparently been welded over or removed. I suspected then there 
was a hidden compartment in the bumper. 
Q. What then happened? 
A. Due to the fact that I was going to have to crawl 
under the vehicle and take it out, compromise myself, we did 
place the subjects in handcuffs at that time due to the fact I 
would need Trooper Porter's help while I was under the car. I 
pulled the rubber covering off. As I did this, two metal 
compartments fell out of the bumper. 
Q. Describe these compartments that fell out. 
A. They were, oh, approximately about 30, 35 inches 
long, and they had an open end to the middle. The open ends 
were in the center. They had cardboard over the ends, and they 
were taped over, and they had been formed to fit right along the 
bumper support. 
Q. What then happened? 
A. I opened the ends of the compartment. I just 
removed the cardboard and discovered a Browning .22 rifle 
secreted inside, along with a quantity of cash, and when I 
removed that, you could see marijuana residue in the 
compartment. 
Q. Did you question the driver about the gun or the 
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money? 
A. I asked Isidro about the gun and the money and asked 
if it was his. He stated yes, that it was his. I asked him if 
Lz was involved with the sale or purchase of drugs, and he 
stated yes, that it was money that he had derived from the sale 
of drugs and the rifle was his. 
Q. With regard to the marijuana residue that you said 
you found also inside the compartment that you found money and 
the gun, did you or any other officer cause that to be tested 
for marijuana? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know who performed that test? 
A. Trooper John Kelly. 
Q. Do you know the results of that test? 
A. They were positive. 
Q. Did you also have any person, any drug dog handler 
come and perform a sniff of the vehicle or the money or the gun 
or compartment? 
A. I did contact Grand County. 
Q. Did that happen? 
A. Yes, sir. Detective --
Q. Was that done in your presence? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what were the results? 
A. Positive. He indicated they alerted on both the car 
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and the money. 
Q. Is this car and money things that can be used in law 
enforcement for either your agency or Grand County? 
A. Yes, it is. 
MR. BENGE: That's all I have of this witness. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. BENGE: I have John McGann, Joe Krissman and 
John Kelly here, but I believe I will rest. 
THE COURT: The Court finds that the State has 
sustained its burden of showing that the defendant vehicle and 
the defendant currency were the product of violation of the 
controlled substances laws of this state and that they are 
forfeitable to the State of Utah to be used as provided by law, 
and the Court will enter an order of forfeiture. 
MR. BENGE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
*** 
THE COURT: Civil number 9407-80 and 81, The State 
of Utah versus the 1988 Nissan Sentra and 31,700 — 570 dollars, 
consolidating those for hearing. 
Ms. Starley, you are standing. 
MS. STARLEY: I am. Your Honor, I was contacted 
yesterday by Mr. Channel from California. He — and I believe 
his secretary had contacted the Court and that also the clients 
have made a motion for continuance. Apparently they were told 
to get an attorney to be here and make an argument for that, so 
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